









Does Short Termism Affect the Quality 









Gibson V A , Rowley A R and Ward C W R 
 
 
Presentation at the RICS Cutting Edge Conference 














Department of Land Management and Development   November 1996 




Contact: Charles W R Ward 
email: C.Ward@reading.ac.uk 
 
NOTE: All References to the “Report” refer to the Report published by the Royal Institution of 
Chartered Surveyors and the Department of the Environment on the Quality of Urban Design , Authors: 
Rowley A R (project leader),  Gibson V A, Ward C W R,. The views expressed in this paper are not 
necessarily communal with those expressed in the Report and represent independent work by the 
authors. 
 Does Short Termism Affect the Quality 
  of Urban Design in the UK?  
 








Does Short Termism Affect the Quality 
















This paper follows the report on the “Quality of Urban Design: Study of the Influence of 
Private Property Decision Maker in Urban Design” (RICS 1996). It focuses on one of the 
findings in the report, namely that decisions made in development, investment and 
occupation seemed overly influenced by short term considerations.  In this paper, the 
authors review the Report and examine the concept of short termism as it affects urban 
design decisions. The paper concludes that although it is difficult to establish whether or not 
short termism exists in many decisions, there are grounds for believing that a priori short 
termism might particularly influence property orientated decisions. The paper ends with 
some implications for policy both at the economy and local level. 
Does Short Termism Affect the Quality 
  of Urban Design in the UK?  
 
1. Introduction 
In  July 1994, the Department of the Environment (DoE) published a discussion document to launch the 
'Quality in Town and Country' Initiative. The aim of the document was to raise awareness of the 
importance of good design and quality both in individual buildings and in the built environment as a 
whole; encourage debate and stimulate ideas about how best to achieve quality in the future; and 
challenge others to see what they are prepared to do to help a diverse quality (DoE , 1995). 
 
The discussion paper pointed to the many factors which influence the local environment ranging from 
the state of the economy both nationally and locally through to detailed matters such as the quality of 
street lighting and the cleaning of public buildings. In his preface to the document, John Gummer said: 
 
 Quality affects us all ... Quality is sustainable ... Quality pays … 
The quality of our surroundings depends not only on government and developers, but upon 
companies as owners and tenants, the professions, local authorities and individuals.  The 
responsibility for what is built, and where, is shared, as are the rewards which good quality 
bestows. 
 
In September 1994, the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors published its response to the Secretary 
of State's Initiative and to his challenge to the individuals and professions in the field.   As part of the 
profession's contributions to the Quality Initiative, the RICS commissioned research from a team of 
researchers from the Department of Land Management and Development at The University of Reading, 
in association with DEGW, planners, architects and designers to examine the roles and influence of 
developers, investors, occupiers and others on the quality of urban design.  
 
In discussing the quality of urban design, there is considerable stress on the need to produce 
environments that can be sustained in the long run. One of the main factors which might constrain the 
creation of good urban design is the possibility that all decision-makers may take too short term a view. 
The decisions  to design, develop invest and agree to occupy a property are all necessarily long term in 
their contractual implications.  Therefore whatever the cause (and these will be reviewed later in this 
paper), the consequences of short termism are likely to be important in property. This paper therefore 
focuses on the aspect of short termism and contrasts the general features of the debate on short termism 
with the findings of the research report 
2. Aims and Objectives of the Research 
 
The aim of the research was to assess the extent to which  property developers (including 
housebuilders), investors and occupiers become involved in the process of urban development and 
design, and to determine in what ways and to what extent they can and do influence the quality of urban 
design. 
 
The four objectives of the research were to assess the role and importance of urban design 
considerations in investment, development and occupation decisions; identify the benefits to investors, 
developers and occupiers arising from the explicit attention to urban design considerations; to identify 
the factors perceived by investors, developers and occupiers as constraining the promotion of good 
urban design; and identify incentives and other measures which might encourage increased 
attention/contribution by investors, developers and occupiers, to urban design quality. 
 
The research comprised (a) a checklist of urban design considerations for use as a common vocabulary 
in the research,  (b) five case studies of contrasting developments, (c)  six expert panels to obtain the 
views of retail and office occupiers, investors, commercial developers and housebuilders, and 
designers; and (d) a literature review.  The research was carried out in the period July- November 1995 
and the report was finally published by the RICS in October 1996. 
 
3. Brief Review of the Report Findings 
We argued that the quality of urban design results from decisions by many different groups of people; 
designers, developers, investors and occupiers.  There  is no immutable law that requires these people 
to consider, never mind incorporate, good urban design in their decision making. From investors’ and 
developers’ viewpoints, urban design is only worth considering if there is a direct benefit to their 
development/ investment decision. Of course there is agreement that good urban design is desirable but 
that agreement does not extend to taking responsibility for creating it.  Developers feel that they are 
constrained by the preferences of their customers, investors feel constrained by the demands of their 
tenants, occupiers rarely find that urban design considerations play much part in deciding between one 
property and another. 
 
Despite this mutual re-enforcing inertia, we found examples which suggest that the standard of urban 
design is improving. Often these improvements are associated with a special factor such as a 
partnership between private and public sectors or a scheme that is sufficiently  large such that a 
developer has to take responsibility for aspects of urban design that do not come under the control of 
designers and developers of smaller schemes, 
 
In considering the process of design,  we concluded that more choice for occupiers would give rise to 
better design. We could argue this by lexicographic utility arguments such that when two properties 
exist which have similar net space and locations, then occupiers may distinguish between them only by 
reference to aspects, e.g. urban design elements, that would not influence their decision if there was 
only one property which satisfied the higher order demands.  
 
There were other constraints identified; rarely are communities effectively involved at the design stage 
yet it is individuals in the surrounding community who may be most sharply affected by the 
development.  The pressures of time in the design and development stage often squeezes out 
consideration of the urban design issues and the site acquisition valuation and costs too often 
underestimate the full costs of achieving sustainable urban design, 
 
However from the point of view of this paper, a key argument was that short horizons are damaging to 
the prospect of improving urban design. Much of the contribution of good urban design may be tied up 
with the increasing the economic life of the property. In a world in which developers, investors and 
occupiers hold a planning horizon of three to five years, extension of economic life by another decade 
may appear irrelevant. In other words, short termism is antithetical to good urban design. 
 
4. Short Termism 
Short termism can be defined as any decision taken which distorts the attainment of a desired long term 
objective by over-emphasis on the short term consequences. Of course any decision which has 
consequences over time will result in trade-offs between the short and long term. This trade-off forms 
the central feature of a considerable body of teaching in economics, finance and indeed property 
valuation since a central principle of valuation and discounting is that events which will occur some 
later time in the future are less important to the valuer than events which occur sooner. To some extent 
the debate about short termism is bound to be a debate about issues such as market efficiency and the 
role of markets in allocation decisions. There will also be contrasts between political,  social, individual 
and market-determined decisions about the long term which can only be reconciled in a political 
framework.  
 
As can be seen from the brief review, the main thrust of the report was not towards t identifying issues 
of short termism but it was a theme which arose during the course of the research and it is also a factor 
which is intrinsically bound up with the debate on environmental sustainability.   There has been much 
written in a polemic style about the importance of short termism in decision making. In some cases, 
commentators have argued that it is a problem peculiarly associated with the US/UK type of capital 
markets contrasted with the banking structures of Germany and Japan.  Others have taken the view that 
it is an endemic feature of organisational decision making. We turn therefore to consider the general 
problems factored under the heading of short termism. 
5. Explanations of Short Termism 
In reviewing the literature of short termism, one finds that it comprises three types; polemical 
assertions, economic analysis and more recently some attempt to provide an behavioural and 
organisational framework. Polemicists that are frequently cited include Drucker (1986) , Jacobs (1991)  
and Merchant and Bruns (1986). Of these Drucker best typifies the approach of the polemicist in 
asserting that much of the blame for short termism behaviour by managers is attributable to their fear of 
the stock market reaction (as reflected in a downward rating of their share price). 
 
 “Everyone who has worked with American managements can testify that the need to 
satisfy the pension fund manager … constantly pushes … towards decisions … (that are 
known to be)… costly if not suicidal mistakes.” (Drucker, 1986, 31). 
 
This contains two common implicit arguments (1) that the pressure on fund managers of institutional 
investors will inevitably lead to short termism and (2) that the consequences of short termism is 
perceived to be enormously important for the economy since it will inevitably cause decisions to be 
biased against projects which have long pay-offs.  In some cases, e.g. Blackwell (1991), it is argued that 
the stock market is to blame and that inherently there is nothing to be done about it other than using 
other means of raising finance or not letting control of the shares pass to institutional shareholders. 
 
The problem with the polemicist argument is that it rarely gets beyond assertions and anecdotes. It also 
gives rise to polemic defences especially from advocates of the efficient market by assertions that 
business people have only themselves to blame because they resolutely refuse to make explicit their 
long term strategies. If businesses only report short term plans and outlook, so the defence goes, it is not 
surprising that investors judge them on that criterion.   
 
The alleged short termism of the stock market seems to arouse value-laden research and inferences. 
Stein (1988) and   Johnson and Kaplan (1987)  argue that the investment horizons of stock market 
investors force entrepreneurs to take short term views of increasing profits now at the expense of the 
longer term. Contradicting these arguments is empirical research that shows the stock market to react 
favourably to announcements on research and development expenditure and  that freedom from the fear 
of take-over tends to reduce the amount of money spent on Research and Development (see Laverty 
(1996) and Walters (1994)  for a review of this work). 
 
Within the economic framework is the Jensen (1986)  argument that by maximising share price, the 
managers are reflecting the optimal trade off between the short and long term. A short term prejudice in 
this framework cannot exist unless the risk premium is high and the proponents of the efficient markets 
view simply assert that the risk premia reflect the social reality. Such a view does not preclude a risk 
premium being higher in one period than in another. Investors may be more risk averse during some 
periods or there may be more uncertainty. Both of these states might lead to higher risk premia. In 
comparing the risk premia between one country and another we might expect some convergence. In a 
global economy with freely transferable capital, one might predict that following Blackwell’s (1991) 
argument, British firms, faced with higher risk premia in the UK stock market, would seek to merge 
with German and Japanese firms in order to acquire their access to low risk premia. Alternatively  the 
UK stock market would attract funds from overseas investors drawn by the excessive premia for equity 
investment.  Observers could simply infer from an observed premia and the consequential high rate of 
discount that consumers and investors care less about the long term than some individuals considering 
the outcomes. This is not an unusual situation, similar conflicts are observed in markets such as some 
news in the tabloid newspapers, which appear distressing and intrusive  to moral commentators but 
which nevertheless proves to be a successful component in ensuring market share. If we have a market 
system which seems to operate efficiently, it may frequently produce solutions of which we individually 
may strongly disapprove. 
 
The issue of risk premia in the UK stock market was investigated by Miles (1993)  who found evidence 
that the term structure of risk premia was upward sloping. This finding, although criticised by Satchell 
and Damant (1995) , would suggest that the attitude of stock market investors was more averse to long 
term projects than might be expected given the term structure of interest rates. (See Miles’(1995)  reply 
to Satchell and Damant).  
 
A common polemic argument is a glib comparison of the corporate financing arrangements in the UK 
and US with other countries such as Germany and Japan. German firms in particular are argued to be at 
a special advantage vis-à-vis  their UK counterparts because of the dominance of banking  in German 
corporate financing.  However as shown by Edwards and Fischer (1993) , this argument is simplistic. 
For example,  since 1960, UK businesses have relied more on banks for their capital than German 
businesses; German businesses do not usually rely on one ‘house’ bank - they commonly use two or 
three;  the monitoring capabilities of German banks are not superior to UK banks; most German 
businesses (accounting for two thirds of output) do not have supervisory boards and although the banks 
have a presence on the supervisory boards (where they exist), they are no better placed to detect 
financial distress than their counterparts in the UK.  Of course, there is some truth in the commonly 
held view about the stability of corporate governance in Germany; the shareholding of even the largest 
companies tends to be dominated by one shareholding entity holding more than 25% of the shares in a 
company; the existence of supervisory boards enables re-construction of company management to be 
carried out with the help of the existing banks whilst in the UK, the equivalent process tends to be 
associated with take-overs which are more radical and costly. 
 
There may be market forces however which are systematic in their effect on the operation of business 
decision making. One example is the argument that managers are operating in two markets when they 
take business decisions. They are operating in the business market when they decide to invest in a 
project and their contribution to the profitability of the business should be reflected in the share price of 
the company. But they are also operating in the labour market and in order to create a large transfer 
value, managers need tangible signs of success. Since managers may move several times in their career, 
successful career-enhancing projects must inevitably have a relatively short-term pay-off. The 
simultaneous operation of the labour and the capital markets therefore might produce an unsatisfactory 
bias towards the short term.  This argument can be placed in the behavioural and organisational 
explanations of short termism. Researchers such as Rumelt  (1987), and Campbell and Marino (1994) 
find evidence that the market for labour distorts managerial investment decisions towards short term 
pay-off projects.  
 
Laverty (op.cit) proposed a framework for analysing the issue of short termism arguing that much of the 
prior research had centred around market efficiency without taking into account the organisational 
framework. By considering the behavioural consequences of present practices, market efficiency 
proponents would simply not understand how apparently inefficient practices might persist. The 
Laverty framework specifies three types of decision influences (economic, individual and 
organisational) and identifies the outcome in terms of the firm’s performance. But the firm’s and its 
competitors’ performance also produces a collective outcome that has the power to add to the feedback 
for future decisions. In this way he argues that practices such as the use of pay-back in investment 
decision-making result in sub-optimal projects being taken on. But if other firms and analysts are also 
using the same criteria, then the firm’s performance would be less well rated by  the stock market if the 
individual decision makers within one firm decided to change. Laverty thus emphasises the importance 
of ensuring that the collective consequences of individual acts be taken into account in research before 
drawing strong inferences about the existence or absence of short termism.  
 
6.  Patterns of Short termism In Property Development 
There are three main ways in which short termism may be manifested in property. The  quality of 
design and construction may be reduced in order to reduce the initial costs but at the expense of higher 
running costs. A variation of this trade-off between capital and revenue costs is shown when a short 
term emphasis reduces the economic life of the property. In the public realm in residential 
developments for example, it may be that a poorer environment will reduce the sense of community and 
shared pride in the neighbourhood and consequentially the development will deteriorate more quickly 
than an alternative estate which has superior public facilities.  Another way in which property may 
exhibit short termism is the issue of moral hazard.  In many cases, there will be consequences of 
decisions made at an early stage of development that are known only by the designers, developers and 
constructor. The residents, tenants and buyers have to accept the development with less information - 
this information asymmetry will be reflected in the price but may distort the decisions involved in the 
development process.  The third way in which short termism can affect property is the externality of the 
development decision or, within the framework suggested by Laverty, the feedback from the collective 
outcomes can affect the individual or institutional decision. Within this heading we would have to 
include the momentum of political short-terrmism: if successive governments legislate and regulate the 
environment in ways that are driven by short term considerations, the consequences are likely to be 
manifested in short term distortions in the property market or indeed any market in which long termm 
decisions are routinely taken. 
7.    Individual decisions and the quality of Urban Design 
It is by no means clear that the investment appraisal techniques commonly in use in the property 
profession will lead to optimal decisions. In previous decades, anomalies such as the valuation of short 
leasehold investments have been exploited by canny investors and the recognition of these anomalies 
have not been quickly recognised universally. However, we could assert that most property investors 
are familiar with the procedure of investment appraisal and Discounted Cash Flow methods of 
valuation. In periods of high inflation the discount rate is high and future expectations of rental growth 
are similarly affected in a positive direction. In periods of high real rates of interest, the optimal (in 
terms of market values) decision will be to use a high rate of discount and therefore it would not be 
surprising if investors were to be heavily influenced by their expectations of market valuations over the 
first few years of their property.  From the point of view of the individual investors much depends on 
how long they expect to hold the property. Our study found that investors were expecting to hold the 
property for between six and ten years. On the basis of data supplied by IPD, between 1981 and 1990, 
investors sold  approximately 25% of properties within five years of their purchase. In the case of shop 
investments the expected holding period was rather longer.  
 
What mattered therefore to their decision was the expected rental growth up to that point. Given this, 
the important point is to ascertain whether market prices and valuation methods correctly reflect the 
effect  of good urban design on the market price. Our research suggested that as far as potential 
purchasers were concerned, the impact was low in the order of factors taken into account in the 
valuation. To that extent therefore, the possibility of short term decisions being driven out of the market 
by competitive forces does not seem forcefully plausible. 
 
“ We have a client who is looking for a business park location. The quality of urban 
design is way down their list. They are looking at how many square feet and the car 
parking.” (quoted in the Investors panel, Report, section 4.2.1) 
 
Still within the framework of individual decision-making, we consider the career motivations of 
developers and investors in the acquisition process. The  argument in favour of short termism would 
suggest that the career horizons of, say, investment  managers are shorter than the interval necessary to 
establish whether or not a particular development is sustaining its value in the long term ( a quality 
which would be expected to be associated with better urban design). In the stock market, the 
performance of investment managers is commonly monitored on the basis of league tables generated at 
quarterly intervals. This does not necessarily imply that one quarter’s underperformance will make or 
break an investment manager.  There are ‘soft’ indicators of investment performance which also 
operate:  the presentation at which competing fund managers vie for investment business can lead to 
funds being allocated to a fund manager who has historically underperformed competitors. Another 
example of the informal indicators are the anecdotal evidence that some investors (George Soros) are 
spectacularly successful at investment timing. These informal factors can mitigate measured 
underperformance in the stock market. 
 
In the property market, where the measurement of investment performance is less reliable (because of 
the lack of market transactions and unambiguous values) the soft factors are likely to be more 
important. The smallness of the market for institutional investors also implies that information about 
activity of development is more likely to be widespread in the investment community. This 
interpretation was confirmed by the investors panel, the members of which were drawn from a selection 
of agencies and  institutional investors. When the discussion focused on the performance of specific 
properties, it rapidly became clear that most of those present had seen, assessed and had clear ideas on 
the success or failure of a large number of properties. Because of the nature of the investment vehicle, 
investment failures can be linked to the institutions and individuals who were responsible.  When a 
development such as that in Brindley Place, Birmingham was discussed, investors compared it ( at least 
in its aspirations) to the Broadgate, London development and were able to offer views on the 
development, the reputation of the designers, investors and potential occupiers.  
 
“The breadth of awareness … was echoed by the expert panel of developers. Places that 
were admired for their quality of urban design included Broadgate, Covent Garden, 
Richmond Riverside, The Lanes in Carlisle and the Lion and Lamb Yard in Farnham. “ 
(Report section 3.2.1) 
 
For developers, a further incentive to establish the feature of quality with a development proposal is the 
possibility of using the quality factor to improve the chance of gaining planning permission. Given that 
we identified the importance of co-operation and partnership between private and public sectors, one 
obvious way in which the co-operation can appear is the planning gain associated with major 
prestigious developments. 
 
The foregoing does not necessarily imply that property developers have visions of creating immortal 
monuments when they approach the development of a particular site. Indeed, what was clear from the 
discussions with developers, designers and investors is a sense of  ‘horses for courses’. Overwhelmingly 
there was a sense that the effort put into the urban design of, say, a prestige city centre development, 
would necessarily be much greater than the sustainability features of a value-for-money housing estate.   
 
The issue of information asymmetry applies easily to the construction and development of property 
especially to residential property. We found, for example, that  
 
“…residential owner-occupiers attached most importance to securing value-for-money 
from the dwelling itself, at least when purchasing new property” (Report section.8.4.1) 
 
“Our houses have a wide frontage so it looks as if the customer is getting more than 
perhaps he is” (Developer quoted in the Report, section 3.2.1) 
 
The information gleaned by occupiers also indicated that they were using signals about quality from 
indicators such as the identity of other occupiers, 
 
“If Boots are in this development it must be right” (Retail occupier quoted in the Report, 
section 5.2.1) 
 
“Their materials are beyond the average and we have a minimum standard that we 
expect. … Arlington go beyond our minimum” (Investor/developer quoted in Report, 
section 4.2.3) 
 
These quotations reveal that considerable information symmetry exists and consequently, more 
emphasis is laid on soft signals. When we talked to the resident occupiers, for example, in one 
development in which several different contractors had built houses, they introduced themselves, not in 
terms of the street names, but in terms of the developer who had built their house. Obviously this 
classification scheme carried more information about both their location and their sense of ownership 
than the street name. 
 
The implication of the information asymmetry for short termism is that occupiers and investors are 
strongly influenced by signals on the part of the developers about the future profitability of the 
developments. This can often lead to observed short termism because the signals that can be made early 
on in the life of the building and its environment can have an exaggerated influence on the valuation. 
 
The final factor in this section is the dimension added by the organisation within which the individual 
makes the decisions. Organisational inertia is an issue which is well researched - see Kelly and 
Amburgey (1991)  , Miller (1994)   Staw (1981)  . The inferences which may be drawn from these 
studies are that in an organisational context, practices and decision processes can persist because of the 
organisational inertia and that conventional beliefs that underline decisions can distort such trade-offs 
as the short-long term profitability. In this context the property sector has plenty of examples in which 
inertia, whether it is at the institutional or professional level, has been associated with a perceived 
inflexibility and resistance to change. Examples might include the unwillingness to offer more flexible 
leases, the fixation on the upwards-only rent review, the resistance in introducing securitisation. Whilst 
these examples have financial dimensions, they also reflect areas in which there is considerable external 
pressure for innovation. 
 
It is not only on the investors and developers side that we see organisation inertia constrain the 
emergence of better urban design. The inertia of corporate real estate organisation has been well 
documented by Avis and Gibson (1989, 1995) and Gibson (1995).   Because the real estate needs of 
companies are rarely treated as part of the organisational strategy, the individuals responsible for 
acquiring space are given little time in order to explore alternative ways of satisfying the organisational 
needs in property. The result is that companies are never in a position to choose from a range of 
potential properties. This lack of choice, as suggested above, inevitably means that properties are 
chosen by occupiers on relatively simple criteria and thereafter the company employees bear the 
implicit cost of the short term decision.  
 
8. Collective Outcomes and feedback 
Of all the charges that might be laid against market solutions to property development, the collective 
issue is the most serious, simply because it involves conflicts that cannot by their nature be resolved by 
the market left to its own devices. We recognise this by constraining the activities of developers by 
planning legislation and regulation. But short term - long term conflicts often involve more subtle 
problems that do not lend themselves to regulatory solution. A simple example may clarify this.  The 
improvement of the quality of urban design may not always be costly to introduce but it does require 
some attention be given to factors which traditionally have been ignored.  If there is an acceptance that 
local residents do not have to be consulted in the design of the environment of new buildings, it is not in 
developer’s or investor’s interest to introduce the practice since it might add to their development time 
and delay a satisfactory sale or completion.  Similarly, there is evidence that occupiers/owners focus on 
the appearance of their own property and spend less time on the neighbouring environment, even when 




“The fact that there is a lake and grass is an extra, but more important is the fact that 
the staff can park when they get here”, (Occupier quoted in the Report, section 5.2.1) 
 
“I like the outside features, the wood and the leaded windows. They  make the house 
look a lot better and I tend to think on the financial side - what I can sell it for and what 
I can make in the long run.” (Resident, quoted in the Report, section 6.2.1) 
 
Given these attitudes, there is no strong incentive to put much effort on improving the public spaces and 
functions in which the developments are provided. Collectively we might agree that the experience of 
working within a visually stimulating landscape must be preferable to that of working within an visually 
impoverished environment but the difference does not appear to be priced by the market. 
 
In some development projects, the designers succeed in generating and sustaining a sense of civic pride 
and collective support that we believe (but cannot yet prove) will produce more successful and 
ultimately more profitable properties. Developers and investors recognised the difficulty of pricing or 
even organising collective solutions. 
 
“It’s not our initiative to take.” (Financial services occupier quoted in the Report, 
section 5.2.3) 
“There is also the cost and price barrier. Individually the cost is too much, but 
collectively it is worth paying for.” ( Agent, quoted in the Report, section 5.2.3) 
 
The investors in the expert panel recognised one instance in which this difficulty can be overcome - the 
agreement to pedestrianise a street in a town centre in order to compete against an out-of-town shopping 
centre.  One might argue that this shows that more competition will act as a sufficient incentive to 
developers and investors to take decisions that are collectively optimal.  But reflection on the issue of 
externalities in market processes quickly reveals that the incentive to act collectively is constrained by 
many factors including the possibility of free riders, group size and distribution. It is a policy of despair 
to leave all collective action to the market. 
 
These are examples of a collective feedback from individual decisions. Since they have a direct 
implication for short termism, they create a need for collective action or even regulation if the pressures 
for short termism are to be resisted. 
 
9.  Some implications for the future 
A peculiar property of short termism is that although many people would assert that it is a major 
problem, few can produce evidence that it exists or that it causes much damage. On the other hand, 
there are, as shown above, grounds for believing that, if it exists generally, short termism is likely to 
affect property to a greater extent than other commercial decisions. We can also point to a number of 
ways in which the potential problem may be alleviated.   
 
We have argued in the report for example that 
 
 “Government needs to acknowledge the extent of its influence on the quality of urban 
design: this goes well beyond public planning policies… Government should lead by 
example.” (Report, section 8.7) 
 
Also we see it as importance that local authorities need to develop urban design strategies for their 
areas in consultation with local property interests. Both of these conclusions come not from a harking 
back to the idea that central government should control all aspects of our lives but on the argument that 
it needs vision and strong leadership to overcome the organisational inertia which is endemic to short 
termism.  
 
We also see virtue in more competition in the development sector. If corporate real estate does succeed 
in establishing itself on the strategic agenda as advocated by Gibson (1995) then business space buyers 
might be enabled to buy or rent space with more discrimination. The more choice there is, (and by 
gaining a longer lead time in identifying corporate space needs, the supply of space can be effectively 
increased), the stronger the demand for good quality of urban design. 
 
We also foresee that changes in the commercial property market  will create more choice. Lizieri (1991, 
1994) has argued that changing economic relationships and business organisation require greater 
flexibility both in terms of the physical structures of buildings (to respond to changing occupier 
requirements) and in relation to leasing relationships. He suggests that the achievement of flexibility has 
been hampered by the institutional structure of the market. In particular, the institutional lease, 
 
‘introduces considerable inflexibility for both owner and occupier. For the occupier, the 
ability to relocate and rationalise property is hampered by the need to sublet unwanted 
property (or buy out the lease) together with use restrictions. For owners, security of 
tenure and absence of break clauses may prevent refurbishment or redevelopment (or 
add marriage value costs) at the optimum time. Yet change is resisted: in part due to the 
structure of long-term financing (banks may insist on standard commercial leases as a 
condition of mortgage funding), in part due to professional inertia.’ (Lizieri, 1991 207-
8).  
 
Since more flexible leases might effectively increase the supply of property to a potential occupier, we 
can see considerable benefit to the quality of urban design in the increasing pressures for flexibility. 
 
The final point comes from the discussion in sections 4 and 5 above. Any decision which depends on 
appraising the future cash flows involves weighting the importance the cash flows over the long and 
short term. In any model of valuation, whether it be an explicit DCF approach or a conventional all-
risk-yield model, the future periods are less heavily weighted than the immediate periods. Thus if 
investment decisions are taken which reflect the market realities, a key pre-condition for curing short 
termism is a low real rate of interest and a stable economic environment. One cannot therefore argue 
that leadership, vision and regulation will somehow cure the potential for short term behaviour without 
some reference to the economic environment. In a market dominated system, short termism demands 
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